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People can earn fame by performing some noteworthy act, such as making a significant scientific discovery, writing a series of popular books, skillfully landing a damaged airliner, or even committing a crime. In each of these situations, people perform some activity; it is noticed and publicized, and because of this attention, they become famous in the eyes of the public. In this article, we report the results of two experiments in which previously nonfamous people attain some degree of fame without actually performing any type of noteworthy act. In these experiments, we briefly paired faces of famous people with faces of nonfamous people to determine whether the nonfamous people would thereafter be viewed as being more famous. In short, we were interested in examining whether a famous person's fame could rub off on a nonfamous person.
Larry Jacoby and colleagues have examined the cognitive processes involved in the attainment of fame in a series of experiments on the false fame effect. In one such study, Jacoby, Woloshyn, and Kelley (1989) had people read a list containing famous (e.g., Gene Autry) and nonfamous names (e.g., Sebastian Weisdorf). As they read the names, people in the divided attention condition simultaneously listened for target numbers in a sequence of random numbers. People in the full attention condition read the names without any other distractions. All the participants then completed a fame judgment task in which they saw the famous and nonfamous names from the study list along with new famous and nonfamous names. People judged whether each name was famous or nonfamous. When people devoted their full attention to the study task and were not distracted by the secondary digit-listening task, they were less likely to misidentify the old nonfamous names as famous. These people were able to recognize the nonfamous names from the study session and accurately claimed that these names were not famous. In contrast, people in the divided attention group were more likely to misidentify the old nonfamous names as famous. They were less successful at rejecting the false feeling of fame that was established by the study list. In other words, although he is not famous, Sebastian Weisdorf became famous because of his inclusion on the study list.
The false fame effect is quite robust. Even when participants were informed that all the names on the study list were actually nonfamous, they still identified the old nonfamous names as famous more often than they identified the new nonfamous names as famous . This finding shows that because the participants were more familiar with the studied nonfamous names, they were more likely to incorrectly claim that these names represented famous people. Other experimental evidence shows that the false fame effect is not fleeting. In fact, its magnitude increases over time. Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, and Jasechko (1989) found that if there was a 24-hour delay between the presentation of the nonfamous names and the fame judgment task, then participants were more likely to identify nonfamous names as famous. Evidently, the delay between study and test decreased people's ability to recollect the names from the list. Then, during the fame judgment task, the old nonfamous names felt somewhat familiar, causing people to claim that the studied nonfamous names were famous (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989) .
The false fame effect is also evident when people view pictures of faces instead of studying names. Bartlett, Strater, and Fulton (1991) had younger and older people study pictures of different nonfamous people. Some of the faces were presented once, and others were presented twice. One week later, both groups saw the old nonfamous faces, new nonfamous faces, and new famous faces, with instructions to judge whether each face was famous using a threepoint scale (definitely famous, possibly famous, or nonfamous). The older group showed a larger false fame effect for faces that appeared twice compared with the faces that appeared only once. One explanation for this finding is that the repeated presentations made the face more familiar, and this caused the older people to mistake this familiarity for fame. In contrast, the younger group showed the opposite effect. In their case, multiple presentations made it easier for them to recall faces that appeared during the first week, and they were able to reject these twicepresented faces as famous. Therefore, they did not make the same misattribution of familiarity as did the older group. The relevant point for the current study is that the false fame effect was produced even though people studied pictures instead of words (names).
Whittlesea's SCAPE Framework
Several aspects of Whittlesea's (1997) Selective Construction and Preservation of Experience (SCAPE) framework provide a meaningful description of the cognitive processes that cause people to mistakenly identify nonfamous people as famous. This framework, which posits an adaptive, constructive, unitary memory model, considers people's objective memory performance and their subjective feelings as they navigate their environment. Remembering, as well as many other judgments including categorization tasks, and preference decisions are the result of two basic cognitive functions: production and evaluation. The production process creates a mental model of the current situation that is a consequence of the interaction between a particular stimulus, such as a target item on a recognition memory task (or a fame judgment task), the current environment, the task, the context, and previous encounters with similar types of material.
Immediately after the construction of the mental model, the evaluation process assesses the overall production experience. These automatic evaluation processes determine whether the current model is coherent (i.e., "makes sense") in that particular setting. People then make an attribution about the outcome of this evaluation. If the model is concordant (i.e., it is not surprising), then there is no need for additional scrutiny of the model. However, if there is discordance between the model and expectations (i.e., it is surprising), then the person will perform a more detailed analysis of the model. These two potential outcomes (concordance and discordance) will cause very different attributions and subsequent decisions about the target information. The interpretation of the production and evaluation process drives a person's decision about the target material. For example, if the target item is difficult to process, then this will generally create a subjective feeling of confusion or disfluency. Alternatively, if the item is easily processed, this will typically generate a feeling of fluency. The decision that a person makes about a target item will be a direct consequence of how this feeling of fluency (or dysfluency) is interpreted in the context of the task.
In one illustrative experiment, Whittlesea and Williams (1998) had people study natural words (RAINBOW), orthographically regular words (PINGLE), and orthographically irregular words (LICTPUB). Later, the participants completed a recognition task during which they saw test probes consisting of old and new words from each of the three categories. In addition to the recognition measures, Whittlesea and Williams measured fluency using pronunciation latencies. The natural words were pronounced most rapidly, followed by the regular and then the irregular nonwords. If fluency alone was the sole indicator that an item had been encountered earlier, then the pattern of hits and false alarms should have followed this same pattern. However, whereas the hits were aligned in this pattern, the false alarms were not. In fact, the regular nonwords produced the most false alarms. The surprising level of fluency associated with the regular nonwords made these items feel old because people interpreted this ease of processing as evidence that the items had been encountered on the study list. In contrast, the irregular words were not processed as fluently, and this made these items feel new. This experiment shows that it is the interpretation of the experienced fluency of processing that plays a large part in determining how people make judgments.
For example, consider how the SCAPE framework accounts for the results from Jacoby's fame judgment task. As people made their decisions about each famous and nonfamous name, they produced a mental model of the names, evaluated the construction of that model, and then made an attribution about the cause of their fluent (or dysfluent) experience. If the nonfamous name Sebastian Weisdorf appeared on an earlier encountered list of names, then it felt more fluent than a new nonfamous name, such as Wilbur Werth. Given that there were no other obvious explanations for the feeling of fluency that arose from this second encounter with Sebastian Weisdorf, this feeling was interpreted as fame. In contrast, the name Wilbur Werth, which was new, did not create a feeling of fluency. Consequently, the person attributed this lack of fluency to the fact that the name was unfamiliar and therefore nonfamous.
Current Research
In the two studies reported here, we examined what happens when nonfamous faces are paired with famous faces. Following the logic of the SCAPE framework, as people examine the nonfamous faces during the fame judgment task, they will produce a mental model of each face and evaluate and then make an attribution about the source of the model. By this account, the nonfamous faces that were and were not paired with the famous faces should lead to different processing experiences and therefore different fame ratings. Specifically, as people construct mental models for the nonfamous faces that were paired with the famous faces, the processing should be more fluent because of the previous association with their obviously famous partners (e.g., Oprah Winfrey, Tom Cruise). As people consider the source of this fluent processing, they will misconstrue this ease as a sign of fame. Consequently, these nonfamous people should attain a higher level of fame than other nonfamous people.
eXPeriMeNT 1
In this experiment, we examined whether pairing faces of nonfamous people with faces of famous people would lead to higher fame judgments for these nonfamous people. To this end, people studied 20 pairs of faces (half of the new nonfamous faces were paired with famous people, and the other half were paired with semifamous people) and determined whether the two people would make strong business partners. We selected this orienting task to encourage our participants to consider the pair as a team and subsequently maximize the relationship between the two people in the pictures.
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Asking people to make the business partners judgment was motivated in part by the literature showing that orienting people to the similarities or differences of stimuli during encoding yields very different outcomes (see Hunt & McDaniel, 1993 , for an extensive review of the differences between distinctive and relational processing). For example, Epstein, Phillips, and Johnson (1975; also see Begg, 1978) had people study paired associates that were either related (beer-wine) or unrelated (beer-dog). During the study portion of the experiment, people had to describe the similarities (relational processing) or the differences (distinctive processing) of each paired associate. Later, people better remembered the related pairs when they processed the distinctive features of the pairs than when they processed the similarities of the pairs. Interestingly, people were better able to remember the unrelated pairs when they processed the similarities than when they processed the differences. For this experiment, we selected a task that was designed to focus on the similarities of the two people depicted on the slides. In order to determine the effect of the orienting task, we asked people in Experiment 2 to consider the distinctive qualities of the two people on each slide.
Based on the preceding logic, we expected that asking people to focus on the similarities of the two unrelated faces would benefit memory for the pairing and perhaps yield a higher fame rating for the new nonfamous people that had been paired with famous people compared with the nonfamous people that had been paired with the semifamous people.
METHOD Participants and Design
Forty-nine York College of Pennsylvania students volunteered their time for this experiment. This experiment used a 2 (old and new faces) × 3 (famous faces, semifamous faces, and nonfamous faces) within-subject research design.
Materials
Before the experimental sessions, we generated stimuli for use as the famous, semifamous, and nonfamous faces. The famous (e.g., Oprah Winfrey, Brad Pitt) and semifamous faces (e.g., Valentino Rossi, Paula Deen) were selected from the 2007 Forbes most wealthy celebrities list (Goldman, 2007) , whereas the nonfamous faces were selected from the Internet. The Forbes rankings used a 100-point rating system that consisted of four variables: earnings, Web rank, press rank, and TV rank. Earnings was measured as the sum of money the person earned over the past year, Web rank consisted of the number of hits on Google, press rank was the number of times the person was mentioned in the media along with the number of times he or she appeared on the top 32 magazine covers, and TV rank was the number of times the person was mentioned or showcased on TV. The famous people had a mean Forbes ranking of 12.35 (SD = 7.25), whereas the semifamous people had significantly lower Forbes rankings (68.50, SD = 26.05), t(38) = 9.28, p < .001.
To determine whether people's perceptions of fame matched the Forbes ratings, we showed 80 faces (20 famous, 20 semifamous, and 40 nonfamous) to undergraduates (N = 20) and asked them to rate the fame of each person using a 1 (not famous at all) to 7 (extremely famous) scale. Predictably, the famous people received the highest fame rating (6.49, SD = 0.36), the semifamous people earned the next highest rating (2.62, SD = 0.77), and the nonfamous faces received the lowest rating (2.24, SD = 0.87). We subjected these results to a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) and found a significant difference between the three conditions, F(2, 38) = 451.68, p < .0001. Post hoc Bonferroni tests indicated that the ratings of the famous faces exceeded those of the other faces, and the semifamous and nonfamous faces were also different from each other. These results show that the famous people were viewed as such and that the semifamous people were slightly more famous than the nonfamous people.
Procedure
For the experimental session, we prepared two slide show presentations: one for the encoding task and one for the fame rating task. During the encoding slide show, participants saw 20 slides. On 10 of the slides, we paired a nonfamous face with a famous face. For the remaining 10 slides, we paired a nonfamous face with a semifamous face. Figure 1 shows two examples of these types of slides. The pairings of the nonfamous people with the famous and semifamous people was randomly determined, as was the presentation order of the 20 encoding slides.
1 Each encoding slide appeared on the screen for 8 s. For each slide, participants rated on a scale of 1 (definitely would not) to 7 (definitely would) whether these two people would make strong business partners. After completing the encoding task, participants completed a distractor task for 90 s. This task consisted of circling as many number 18s as they could find on a digit-filled sheet of paper. Finally, participants judged the level of fame for 80 faces using a 1 (not famous at all) to 7 (extremely famous) Likert scale. There were six different types of faces: old famous faces, old semifamous faces, old nonfamous faces, new famous faces, new semifamous faces, and new nonfamous faces. Participants had 8 s to make each judgment.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We submitted the fame ratings (see Table 1 for the means of each condition) to a 2 (face status: old or new) × 3 (fame: famous, semifamous, or nonfamous) ANOVA. As expected, the levels of fame elicited different ratings, F(2, 96) = 819.50, p < .05, η 2 = .95. The main effect of face status was also significant. The old photographs (M = 4.12) received higher fame ratings than the new photographs (M = 3.88), F(1, 48) = 21.48, p < .05, η 2 = .31. This particular result is consistent with the findings reported in Jacoby's work on the false fame effect, in which a recent encounter with a name increased the likelihood that it would be rated as famous . In our case, exposure to a face, regardless of fame level, increased the fame ratings.
Most importantly, there was a significant interaction between status and fame, F(2, 96) = 3.99, p < .05, η 2 = .08. This interaction resulted from the fact that the difference between the ratings for the old and new famous was much larger (0.42) than the differences between the old and new semifamous faces (0.15) and old and new nonfamous faces (0.14). This finding is understandable in light of the SCAPE framework. The old famous faces were high-profile figures whose pictures regularly appear in magazines, newspapers, Web sites, and television programs. Also, these pictures were recently encountered during the encoding task, further priming their availability. The combined effects of previous encounters in the mainstream media and the recent exposure during the encoding task affected people's fame ratings of the old famous faces. During the fame rating task people created a mental model of the photograph, evaluated the model's fluency, and then made an attribution of the cause of their experience. In the case of the old famous faces, they were easily (fluently) produced, and then this ease of processing was attributed to the fact that the person in the photograph was famous. The old semifamous and old nonfamous faces were also more fluently processed than new faces; however, this effect was smaller because these two types of faces were not available in numerous mass media outlets.
The Fate of Old Nonfamous Faces
The comparison of most interest from this experiment is available in Figure 2 . As predicted, when we paired faces of nonfamous people with faces of famous people (e.g., pairing a nonfamous person with actor Tom Cruise), this led to higher fame ratings than when we paired faces of nonfamous people with faces of semifamous people (pairing a nonfamous face with Roger Federer) or with faces of entirely new nonfamous people, F(2, 96) = 25.62, p < .05, η 2 = .35. Post hoc Bonferroni tests showed that the nonfamous faces who had been paired with famous faces received higher fame ratings than people paired with semifamous faces or completely new nonfamous faces (both ps < .001). The ratings for the people paired with semifamous faces or new nonfamous faces were not significantly different (p = .13). According to the SCAPE framework, associating these nonfamous faces with famous faces increased the fluency with which they were processed during the rating task. As people judged each of these nonfamous faces, they were surprised by this fluent processing, and this caused them to interpret this as evidence that these nonfamous faces represented people with a higher degree of fame.
experiment 2
The findings from Experiment 1 indicated that pairing a famous face with a nonfamous face caused people to provide higher ratings for the nonfamous face. Pairing the nonfamous faces with semifamous faces during the orienting task did not yield higher fame ratings. One outstanding empirical question from Experiment 1 is the role of the orienting task on this fame inflation effect. In Experiment 1, the orienting task (would the two people make strong business partners?) actively encouraged participants to pair the two people together. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine whether this pairing process was necessary to produce the inflated fame reported in Experiment 1. In this experiment, instead of performing an orienting task that encouraged participants to pair the two people together and hence strengthen their relationship, we asked participants to consider which of the two people was more independent. This question was designed to have participants think about the differences between the two people.
In the item-specific, distinctive processing literature (e.g., Hunt & McDaniel, 1993) , when people focused on the distinctive features of unrelated paired associates, this reduced memory performance compared to when the paired associates were related. If the type of orienting task was important for produc- Thirty-four participants were drawn from the same pool of undergraduate York College students as in Experiment 1. Importantly, none of the participants in this experiment took part in Experiment 1. The same design, materials, and basic procedure that were used in Experiment 1 were used in this experiment. However, instead of being asked to rate whether the two people would make strong business partners, participants were asked to rate whether the person on the left (or right) was more independent than the person on the right (or left). The variation of left or right was randomly assigned to each participant. In all other ways (distractor task format, task duration, and fame rating parameters), this experiment was identical to Experiment 1.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We used the same data analysis strategy that we used in Experiment 1 for this set of data. We performed a 2 (status: old, new) × 3 (fame: famous, semifamous, nonfamous) ANOVA on the fame ratings (see Table 1 for the means of each condition). Consistent with Experiment 1, the levels of fame elicited different ratings, F(2, 66) = 517.97, p < .05, η 2 = .94. The main effect of status was also significant. The old faces (M = 4.09) received higher fame ratings than the new faces (M = 3.83), F(1, 33) = 28.37, p < .05, η 2 =.46. Most importantly, there was a significant interaction between status and fame, F(2, 66) = 9.14, p < .05, η 2 = .21. As with Experiment 1, this interaction indicates that the difference between the ratings for the old and new famous was much larger (0.57) than the differences between the old and new semifamous faces (0.20) and the old and new nonfamous faces (0.02).
The Fate of Old Nonfamous Faces
The right-hand side of Figure 2 presents the mean ratings for the new nonfamous faces, nonfamous faces paired with semifamous faces, and nonfamous faces paired with famous faces. As in Experiment 1, there was a significant difference between these three measures, F(2, 66) = 8.37, p < .05, η 2 = .20. Planned post hoc Bonferroni tests revealed that pairing nonfamous faces with famous faces led to the higher fame ratings than when nonfamous faces were paired with semifamous faces (p = .002) or when they were entirely new nonfamous faces (p = .064). The new faces and those paired with semifamous faces did not differ (p = .222). Overall, the results from this experiment replicate Experiment 1 in showing that pairing nonfamous faces with famous faces causes a nonfamous face to earn a higher fame rating than if he or she had been paired with a semifamous partner or if he or she were a new face presented during the test phase. Importantly, this pattern of results was evident even though participants were asked to consider the differences between the pairings of famous and nonfamous faces.
Analysis Combining Experiments 1 and 2
One issue we want to address is that the effects in Experiment 1 were somewhat larger than those in Experiment 2. Because these two experiments used different orienting tasks, it was important to determine whether the type of task yielded different ratings. To test whether task type affected the magnitude of the effects reported in the two experiments, we performed a 2 (status: old, new) × 3 (fame: famous, semifamous, nonfamous) by × 2 (Experiment: 1 or 2) mixed-factor ANOVA. If experiment/orienting task was a significant factor, then we should see a main effect for experiment, or experiment should interact with one of the other variables. This did not happen. The main effect of the experiment (F = 0.20), the experiment and fame interaction (F = 1.01), and the experiment and status interaction (F = 0.03) were not significant. The three-way interaction was also not significant (F = 0.44). Consequently, the type of orienting task did not significantly affect the magnitude of the fame rating differences that we reported in Experiments 1 and 2.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of these two experiments demonstrate a new way for people to attain a higher level of fame. Rather than writing a book, creating a new mathematical model to explain people's spending habits, or embarking on a fruitful line of cancer research, the nonfamous people in our studies were simply placed in close proximity to famous people. In a sense, the famous person's fame "rubbed off " on the nonfamous person. This pattern of results was evident when we had an orienting task that emphasized a partnership between the famous and nonfamous faces (Experiment 1) and when we asked people to consider how the nonfamous faces differed from the famous faces (Experiment 2). Thus, our results show that simply being paired with a famous person has the potential to raise a person's fame level independent of his or her actual behavior.
To explain the pattern of results reported in these two experiments, we appealed to the principles of Whittlesea's SCAPE framework. The SCAPE account has been applied to a number of memory-based effects, including familiarity-based misattributions (Kronlund & Whittlesea, 2006; Whittlesea & Leboe, 2000) , false memories (Whittlesea, 2002) , and the revelation effect (Whittlesea & Williams, 2001) . Accordingly, as people navigate their environment, they create mental models of their surroundings. The productions of these models are then evaluated for their coherency. Next, the person interprets the outcome of this process by attributing the phenomenological experience to a particular source. As people were making their fame judgments in our two experiments, they created and evaluated mental models of each face. These evaluations led to attributions of source. For example, in the case of the famous faces, these were easily and coherently processed. This ease of processing was interpreted as evidence that the face belonged to a famous person, which it did. The nonfamous faces that were previously paired with one of the famous faces were processed more fluently than the nonfamous faces that appeared along with semifamous faces. People experienced this ease of processing and attributed it to the person's fame. Consequently, they provided slightly higher ratings for these nonfamous people than for the other types of nonfamous faces (those paired with semifamous faces, or the new nonfamous faces).
Parallels With Other Findings
Although our findings are unique, there are other findings in the literature that are somewhat similar. For example, Skowronski, Carlston, Mae, and Crawford (1998) found that people spontaneously transferred traits from one person to another when making impression formation judgments. There is also a clear connection between our results and evaluative conditioning, which occurs when a person's attitude toward a neutral item changes after it is paired with an item that has a decidedly positive or negative attitude attached to it (Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992; Martin & Levely, 1978) . For example, in a popular evaluative conditioning study, Staats and Staats (1958) paired names of nationalities (e.g., German, Dutch) with positive (happy) or negative traits (bitter). After these pairings, people were asked to judge the pleasantness of many different nationalities, including those they encountered during the first part of the study. The nationalities that had been consistently paired with positive terms were rated as more pleasant than those that had been paired with negative terms.
Interestingly, Jones, Fazio, and Olsen (2009) recently suggested that evaluative conditioning is caused in part by a misattribution process. According to their implicit misattribution model of evaluative conditioning, people mistake their feelings about the conditioned stimulus (CS) for the unconditioned stimulus (US). In other words, when people encounter the CS, their impressions of the US come to mind and, without a more available likely source, people attribute their current impressions to the CS. Importantly, this type of misattribution occurs even when people are explicitly warned of the relationship between the CS and the US. People are unable to stop themselves from mistaking their feelings of one stimulus for another (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) .
Unfortunately, the SCAPE framework and the implicit misattribution model make similar predictions about the outcomes of our experiments. That said, these experiments were not designed to disambiguate these two theoretical approaches to describing the same effects. In our view, the SCAPE framework seems to provide a more thorough account of the situations under which people make these sorts of misattributions. Whereas Jones's account focuses on confusion of the original stimulus and the test stimulus, the SCAPE account explains what types of situations will increase the likelihood of misattribution errors, and it provides a detailed account of the cognitive processes that produce these asymmetrical ratings between the two types of old nonfamous faces.
According to the SCAPE framework, it is the surprising fluency coupled with the low expectations of fame (in contrast to the high degree of fame attached to the truly famous people) that produces that feeling of fame people reported for the nonfamous faces that were previously paired with the famous people. Specifically, it is the evaluation of the surprising degree of fluency attached to the nonfamous faces paired with the famous faces that produced the inflated fame effects reported in this article.
Nevertheless, we believe that our paradigm is a useful tool for discovering how pairings of different stimuli can affect behaviors, as well as explicitly and implicitly held beliefs. Given the results of these two experiments, it is important for people to give some thought to the way in which they arrive at judgments of others. Although attaching fame to a nonfamous person is not a negative judgment, our results suggest that people can attain certain qualities that belong to another person simply by associating two people. 1. We are aware that gender is an important aspect of the false fame effect (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Steffens, Buchner, & Mecklenbräuker, 2005) . However, the higher end of the Forbes ratings contained more men than women. Consequently, our pool of famous and semifamous people was seven famous men, three famous women, seven semifamous men, and three semifamous women. This prevented us from using gender as a factor in our analyses. Importantly, we used random assignment to pair the nonfamous faces with their famous or semifamous partners.
